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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
ADMISSIBILITY IN FEDERAL COURT OF EVIDENCE
OVERHEARD ON EXTENSION PHONE
Rathbun v. United States
355 U. S. 107 (1957)
Petitioner, in New York, spoke by telephone with Sparks in Pueblo,
Colorado and threatened his life. In anticipation of another call, Sparks
requested members of the local police force to overhear the conversation,
using an extension phone in Sparks' home, and they overheard peti-
tioner's subsequent call threatening Spark's life. At the trial the police
officers testified to the conversation over timely objection that section 605
of the Federal Communications Act had been violated.' Petitioner was
convicted of transmitting an interstate communication which threatened
life2 and the Court of Appeals affirmed.3 The Supreme Court granted
certiorari limited to the question of whether the use as evidence of the
conversation overheard on an extension telephone was prohibited.4 The
Court found that the conversation was not "intercepted" as required
by the Act, and thus the statute had not been violated.
The technical verbal approach taken by the Court in this decision
seems to undercut the policy considerations of the Act, that surreptitious
"eavesdropping" upon telephone conversation breeds legal enforcement
inconsistent with standards of privacy and security. Prior to the Com-
munications Act of 1934 telephone wiretapping was not governed by
Federal restriction5 except for a period during the first World War.6
With the strong implication that the main purpose of the Federal
Communications Act was to place the subject matter of the Radio Act
148 STAT. 1103 (1934), 47 U.S.C. §605 (1952), ". . . no person not being
authorized by the sender shall intercept any communication and divulge or publish
the existence, contents, substance, purport, effect, or meaning of such intercepted
communication to any person ... "
262 STAT. 741 (1948), 18 U.S.C. §875(b)(c) (1952).
3236 F.2d 514 (10th Cir. 1956).
4 Benanti v. United States, 355 U.S. 96 (1957), decided the same day as
Rathbun determined that information obtained and divulged by state agents in
violation of Section 605 is inadmissible in federal court, and that testimony in
court is divulgence within the meaning of the statute.
5 Constitutionality of wiretapping evidence was upheld in a 5-4 decision in
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 66 A.L.R. 376 (1928). Evidence was
received without question in the years following; Rosenzweig, The Law of Wire-
tapping, 32 CORNELL L. Q. 514, n. 130 at 533 (1947).
640 STAT. 1017 (1918), "[whoever] . . . shall, without authority and without
the knowledge and consent of the other users thereof, except as may be necessary
for operation of the service, tap any telegraph or telephone line. .. ."
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of 1927' under control of the newly created Federal Communications
Commission, the Supreme Court in Nardone v. United States' held
section 605 to be a rule of evidence in the federal courts prohibiting
federal agents from testifying-to conversations overheard through wire-
tapping interstate communications, in criminal trials.9
The federal courts were confronted with problems of definition
brought about by the use of communications terminology within the
statute drawn from the earlier Radio Act."° In defining the statute
the basic assumption was that authorization by the sender precluded any
interception insofar as that term meant a violation of the Act. Similarly
the finding of non-interception made irrelevant the problem of identi-
fying the sender and defining the term "authorized."
A technical reading of "interception" would require a physical
break between sender and receiver. Based on a dictionary definition an
early district court decision held evidence recorded with a device attached
to the telephone wire inside a house admissible." This approach was
subsequently approved by the Supreme Court in Goldman V. United
States12 where the protection afforded by the Act was said to be confined
to transmission of the message only. Following this pronouncement
communications overheard while standing near a telephone receiver and
conversation heard directly -by government agents were held admissible. 3
In contradistinction the broader interpretation of "intercept" might have
7 Sectioh 27 of the Radio Act of 1927, 44 Stat. 1172 drafted for radio and
telegraphic communications was reenacted almost verbatim into §605 of the
Federal Communications Act. The managers of the bill repeatedly declared that
"The Bill as a whole does not change existing law," 78 CONG. Rac. 10313 (1934).
See Westin, The Wire-Tapping Problem: An Analysis and a Legislative Proposal,
52 COLUM. L. REv. 165 (1952). And see S. Rep. No. 781, 73d Cong. Zd Sess. 11
(1934).
8 302 U.S. 379 (1937).
9 308 U.S. 338 (1939). On the second hearing of the case Justice Frankfurter
delivering the opinion of the Court, at p. 340 declared; ". . . the trial judge must
give opportunity, however closely confined, to the accused to prove that a sub-
stantial portion of the case against him was a fruit of the poisonous tree." Weiss
v. United States, 308 U.S. 321 (1939), held intrastate communications within the
Act.
10 See supra note 7.
11 United States v. Yee Ping Jong, 26 F. Supp. 69, 70 (W.D.Pa. 1939):
"Webster's New International Dictionary defines the verb 'intercept' in part as
follows: 'to take or seize by the way, or before arrival at the destined place.'"
12316 U.S. 129 (1942). Here federal agents obtained evidence listening
through the wall of an adjoining room by the use of a "detectaphone," the Court
finding no interception in this type of "eavesdropping."
13 United States v. Bookie, 229 F.2d 130 (7th Cir. 1956); Rayson v. United
States, 238 F.2d 160 (9th Cir. 1956), involved overhearing while near the receiver;
see United States v. Guller, 101 F. Supp. 176 (E.D. Pa. 1951); while Billeci v.
United States, 184- F.2d 394 (D.C. Cir. 1950), and United States v. Lewis, 87
F. Supp. 970 (D.D.C. 1950), reversed on other grounds, 184 F.2d 394 (1950) in-
volved hearing evidence directly.
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included a physical or non-physical "break" or "overhearing" not between
sender and receiver, but proximate in space to either."4
Construction of the term "sender" permits several possibilities,
invoking a theory announced in United States v. Polakoff'5 that telephone
conversation is "antiphonal"; each party being alternately sender and
receiver. This view recognizes the disadvantages of separating conversa-
tion into segments of sender and receiver which is more readily accom-
plished in telegraphic and radio communications. 6 While the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals applied the "antiphonal" concept in the Polakoff
case, they there held that a recording made using an extension telephone
was inadmissible where one party had consented, on the theory that
since both parties were alternately senders, authorization of both was
required by the statute."
Notwithstanding the possible merits of the "two-party" theory,
the majority of the federal courts have rejected it. Rather, they construe
telephone conversation as being alternately sender and receiver, but
require authorization of one party only for a finding of "non-intercep-
tion" and admissibility of the overheard conversation as evidence.
1 s
It is evident that the conflict of theory in the federal courts was the
result of the Nardone cases' 9 which, when viewed against the background
of the Act, represent a policy formulation. The rationale there announced
was that as a matter of public policy the enforcement of federal law
by overzealous authorities should be discouraged where it would intrude
unethically upon matters of personal privacy. This recognizes that
wiretapping under certain circumstances may be, as phrased by Justice
Holmes, "dirty business," 2 leading to possible encroachment upon societal
welfare. Thus emerged a concept of "fair play" which urged restriction.
14 United States v. Hill, 149 F. Supp. 83 (S.D.N.Y. 1957); United States v.
Coplon, 185 F.2d 629 (2d Cir. 1950).
15 112 F.2d 888 (2d Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 653. The "two party"
theory was followed in Reitmeister v. Reitmeister, 162 F.2d 691 (2d Cir. 1947);
United States v. Gruber, 123 F.2d 691 (2d Cir. 1941) ; cf. James v. United States,
191 F.2d 472 (D.C. Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 948. There is argument that
the "two party" theory was undercut by the Goldman holding in Chase's con-
currence in Reitmeister v. Reitmeister, supra.
16 The various communication theories are treated in Bernstein, The Fruit of
the Poisonous Tree, 37 ILL. L. REV. 99 (1942).
17 Supra note 15.
18 United States v. White, 228 F.2d 832 (7th Cir. 1956) ; Flanders v. United
States, 222 F.2d 163 (6th Cir. 1955). This theory would seem to predict that when
party A telephones party B, B could authorize wiretapping and be viewed as a
"sender" even though he has made no conversation. To thus view B as "sender"
seems anomalous.
19 Supra note 8. Nardone v. United States, supra note 9.
20 Holmes, dissenting in Olmstead v. United States, supra note 5, at 470:
"If the existing code (making it a misdemeanor to interrupt a message over tele-
phone lines) does not permit district attorneys to have a hand in such dirty busi-
ness it does not permit the judge to allow such iniquities to succeed."
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The Supreme Court subsequently reiterated that exclusion of logically
relevant evidence rested on a policy measure21 designed to constrict
federal enforcement when it overstepped the bounds of eithical conduct,
but clarified the Nardone formula determining the limitations of the
term "intercept." 2
2
The instant case has conditioned the policy implications of Section
605 upon definitional variables rather than on a meaningful appraisal
of rationale. The majority rests its finding of non-interception not on
the basis that one party's authorization was necessary, i.e., Sparks, but
that since the clause immediately following the principal portion of the
section says:
• . . no person not being entitled thereto shall receive or assist
in receiving any interstate or foreign communication by wire
or radio and use the same or any information therein contained
for his own benefit or for the benefit of another not entitled
thereto ...
the inference is that one entitled to receive a communication may do as
he pleases with it. The court equates a "receiver" broadcasting a message
and a party holding out his handset so another can hear from it" and
finds these situations indistinguishable from a person permitting an out-
sider to listen in on an extension phone; interception has not occurred.25
Finding persuasiveness in the fact that the telephone extension is a widely
used instrument and that Congress couldn't have meant to restrict its
use, the Court states that:
Each party to a telephone conversation takes the risk that the
other party may have an extension telephone and may allow
another to overhear the conversation. When such takes place
there has been no violation of any privacy of which the parties
may complain. Consequently., one element of Section 605,
interception, has not occurred.26
The dissent adheres to the Polokoff case and views the conduct of
the officers in this case as being an "interception" because there has
21 Goldstein v. United States, 316 U.S. 114 (1942).
22 Goldman v. United States, supra note 13.
2 3At foot note 7 of the instant case, 355 U.S. at 110, the court cites a dictum
from the Polakoff case, supra note 15 at 889: "We need not say that a man may
never make a record of what he hears on the telephone by having someone else
listen to an extension, or as in the case at bar, even by allowing him to interpose a
recording machine. The receiver may certainly himself broadcast the message as
he pleases. .. ."
24 This situation arose in the Bookie case, supra note 13.
25 To strengthen this proposition, the Court poses a hypothetical situation; an
employer directing his secretary to listen to business conversation over an extension
phone, and concludes: "It is unreasonable to believe that Congress meant to extend
criminal liability to conduct which is wholly innocent and ordinary." 355 U.S. at
Ill. The dissent finds this logically distinguishable from a police officer called in
to detect crime, 355 U.S. at 113.
261d. at 111.
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been no authorization by the petitioner-sender 7 It is suggested that
since the Nardone Court read "no person" in a strict literal sense, the
Court here should interpret "sender" similarly, rather than to mean just
one of the parties to the conversation.
The result in the Rathbun case has seized upon the manipulative
view of the term "intercept" rather than to extend the periphery of
policy formulation to a consistent application to criminal justice. Without
deciding who the "sender" is the Court has inserted a new interpretation
into Section 605 by holding that there can be no interception if one is
entitled to receive a communication. Following this theory it would seem
that when one is "entitled to receive," any conduct which would be
termed an "interception" were he not the receiver is by definition
precluded from reaching that state. The principal portion of the statute,
"no person not authorized by the sender" is now relegated to a posture
of little meaning since a receiver can do no wrong. On this basis, if an
extension phone was conclusively determined as being physically between
two parties to a conversation one listening on the extension could logically
be viewed as "entitled to receive." Having been on the same circuit as
the intended party, the message reached him first.2" By the majority's
theory a person listening on the extension would be immune from the
mandate of the Statute, even though neither party had consented! A
logical construction of "authorized by the sender" would solve this,
but the theory of the instant case would compel a finding of non-
violation. The majority's reliance upon Congressional meaning lends
little support to their theory since Congress did not speak regarding the
application of the Act to evidence, or telephones.
29
The majority has employed the unsatisfactory telephonic terms
within the statuteao to narrow considerably the underlying policy rationale
that the enforcement of the criminal law has boundaries which should
27 Mr. Justice Frankfurter, with whom Mr. Justice Douglas joins in dis-
senting, defines an "interception" in the principal case as ". . . an intrusion by
way of listening to the legally insulated transmission as though between a speaker
and a hearer. . . ." 355 U.S. at 113. Though the dissent agrees with the Polakoff
view, which would require both parties' consent, it views only authorization of
the petitioner as necessary for non-violation.
28 Dicta in the court of appeals decision of the principal case, supra note 3
at 517: "It may be possible as far as we know to attach an extension phone so
that the message passing over it reaches the ear of the listener before it reaches
the ear of the one carrying on the conversation and for whom it is intended. If
such is possible, in such case it would constitute an interception."
29 Supra note 7.
aoThe comparison of a statute drafted with telephone wiretapping in mind,
i.e. the Act of 1918, supra note 6, and §605 yields a marked difference in termi-
nology. But attempts to authorize wiretapping since the Nardone decision have
failed. See S. 3756, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. (1938); S. Rep. No. 1790, 75th Cong.,
Id Sess. 3 (1938) ; H.J. Res. 571, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. (1940); H.R. 2266, 77th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1941) ; H.R. 3099, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. (1941); H.R. 4228, 77th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1941).
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not be transgressed, regardless of meritorious results. From the policy
standpoint the facts of the instant case would seem to rhyme with the
formulation that "Congress may have thought it less important that
some offenders should go unwhipped of justice than that officers should
resort to methods deemed inconsistent with ethical standards and destruc-
tive of personal liberty."'" The fact of an extension phone, in itself,
should not give rise to such circumvention, for the original interpretation
"was not merely meticulous reading of technical language-but transla-
tion into practicality of broad considerations of morality and public well
6eing." 3 2 A recent district court decision has logically avoided the hyper-
technical pitfalls inherent in section 605, suggesting:
Science has made rapid advances in the communications field
since 1934. Today there are means available to listen in on
telephone calls without the use of an actual tap or a physical
contact with the lines of transmission. To hold that these
modern methods are without the scope of the statute means
that the law is a dead letter. The spirit of the Act requires the
exclusion of this evidence.
33
The ramifications of the present decision are clear. No longer will
state or federal authorities be threatened with the application of section
605 so long as they can utilize regularly installed eitension phones to
"listen in" with the permission of the one receiving the message. That
Congress envisioned such manipulation of the statute is open to serious
doubt. The struggle between the policy considerations present in the wire-
tapping are of the law and the amorphous nature of the statutory lan-
guage within section 605 evidences a clear need for Congressional
reappraisal and action.
R. Otto Meletzke
31 Nardone v. United States, supra note 8, at 383.
32 Nardone v. United States, supra note 9, at 340.
33 In United States v. Hill, 149 F. Supp. 83 (S.D.N.Y. 1957) it was held that
a microphone jacked into a tape recorder and held by an agent of the Federal
Bureau of Narcotics above the telephone without the defendant's consent was an
interception within §605 and therefore inadmissible.
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